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Natural pedagogy is a human-specific capacity that allows us to acquire cultural
information from communication even before the emergence of the first words,
encompassing three core elements: (i) a sensitivity to ostensive signals like eye contact
that indicate to infants that they are being addressed through communication, (ii)
a subsequent referential expectation (satisfied by the use of declarative gestures)
and (iii) a biased interpretation of ostensive-referential communication as conveying
relevant information about the referent’s kind (Csibra and Gergely, 2006, 2009, 2011).
Remarkably, the link between natural pedagogy and another human-specific capacity,
namely language, has rarely been investigated in detail. We here argue that children’s
production and comprehension of declarative gestures around 10 months of age are in
fact expressions of an evolving faculty of language. Through both declarative gestures
and ostensive signals, infants can assign the roles of third,second, and first person,
building the ‘deictic space’ that grounds both natural pedagogy and language use.
Secondly, we argue that the emergence of two kinds of linguistic structures (i.e., proto-
determiner phrases and proto-sentences) in the one-word period sheds light on the
different kinds of information that children can acquire or convey at different stages of
development (namely, generic knowledge about kinds and knowledge about particular
events/actions/state of affairs, respectively). Furthermore, the development of nominal
and temporal reference in speech allows children to cognize information in terms of
spatial and temporal relations. In this way, natural pedagogy transpires as an inherent
aspect of our faculty of language, rather than as an independent adaptation that pre-
dates language in evolution or development (Csibra and Gergely, 2006). This hypothesis
is further testable through predictions it makes on the different linguistic profiles of
toddlers with developmental disorders.
Keywords: language development, natural pedagogy, pointing, child communication, learning from
communication, declarative gestures, concepts, knowledge about kinds
Introduction
In an article dedicated to explore some core similarities and diﬀerences between humans and non-
human apes, Tomasello and Herrmann (2010) argue that our species have “more sophisticated
cognitive skills for dealing with the social world in terms of intention-reading, social learning, and
communication” (Tomasello and Herrmann, 2010, p. 5). The authors suggest that these skills are
necessary for language but precede it in development (and presumably in evolution), as children
can communicate before the emergence of speech through declarative gestures like pointing.
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In this way, they are already able to manifest to adults
through pointing the referents about which they intend to
communicate and learn. Language would add to this scenario
other “fundamentally cooperative communicative devices –
known as linguistic conventions (or symbols) – whose meanings
derive from a kind of cooperative agreement that we will all
use them in the same way” (Tomasello and Herrmann, 2010,
p. 5).
The idea of a human-speciﬁc form of communication that
precedes the emergence of language can also be observed in some
archeologists’ interpretations of the archeological record of our
hominin ancestors:
Could the (Neanderthal) knapper of Marjorie’s core have learned
the signiﬁcance and role of, say, the distal convexity without
recourse to language? (. . .) We believe that the answer is yes. If
a teacher drew a novice’s attention repeatedly to the distal convexity
(by pointing, for example), this would have been enough. However,
we believe that (this technology) would have been very diﬃcult to
learn without some sort of guided attention; it probably required
active instruction, and active instruction relies on joint attention
and theory of mind. It does not require language. (Wynn and
Coolidge, 2010; our italics).
That said, we think that this thesis is wrong for reasons that we
set out in this article. First, we will argue that the comprehension
and production of declarative gestures by infants reﬂect structural
aspects of human language. In particular, we suggest that
declarative gestures are the ﬁrst expression of determiner phrases
in development, to which they are developmentally linked,
corresponding to the assignment of the role of ‘third person’ in
communicative acts. In combination with ostensive signals (like
eye contact), which are used to deﬁne the initial ﬁrst and second
persons involved in communicative acts, declarative gestures in
this way complete the ‘deictic space’ within which both natural
pedagogy and language use naturally occur. Its foundations are
centrally aﬀected in infants with autism spectrum conditions,
where not only the personal pronouns but also declarative
gestures as well as determiner phrases at large can be aﬀected
(Lee et al., 1994; Modyanova, 2009; Hobson et al., 2010; Curtin
and Vouloumanos, 2013; Shield and Meier, 2014; Hinzen and
Schroeder, 2015).
Having linked the ‘pre-linguistic communication’ mediated
by ostensive signals and declarative gestures to the faculty of
language1, we will reﬂect on the kind of knowledge that children
can acquire or convey through communication in light of the
linguistic structures that emerge throughout the one word-
period. Wewill suggest that at the ‘proto-determiner phrase stage’
children can only acquire knowledge that is generalized to kinds
and that the emergence of the ‘proto-sentence stage’ in language
development allows them to cognize information in terms of
temporal and spatial relations — i.e., to “reconstruct from some
parts of the adult’s (communication) a local, episodic content
for the informative intention” (Csibra, 2010, p.157). However,
children’s ﬁrst assertions are bound to the here-and-now of
1In this paper we will mainly focus on declarative gestures, though we recognize
the central role of ostensive signals not only for natural pedagogy, but for language
use and development.
speech. Language development not only expands these spatial
and temporal limits, but also improves the capacity of children
to understand and produce statements with sentential arguments
that are anaphorically connected to entities and/or propositions
that are given in the discourse.
We will argue for a faculty of language whose core function
is to perform (through the production of linguistic structures)
diﬀerent referential acts in the spatial, temporal, and discourse
domains, grounding all human-speciﬁc forms of referential
communication — including infants’ use of declarative gestures.
In this way, language would be inherent to human-speciﬁc
aspects of communication from very early in development,
instead of being a ‘tool’ designed by and at the disposal of
human communication only at later ages. Our view contrasts
with the perspective of formal linguistics, which has left the
referential aspect of language largely aside during the last
50 years, conﬁning itself to an ‘internalist’ inquiry as deﬁned in
Chomsky (2000). Independent linguistic evidence as synthesized
in Hinzen and Sheehan (2013), however, suggests that the full
spectrum of forms of reference available to humans patterns
along with grammatical conﬁgurations, rather than being
governed by non-linguistic factors. Reference is thus inherent to
grammar.
This illustrates that we are not merely continuing the
old Humboldtian debate about the relative primacy of either
language or thought, by arguing in favor of a ‘language-ﬁrst’
view. Instead we advocate that a speciﬁc capacity, namely natural
pedagogy, is inherently integrated with language, making them
two sides of the same human-speciﬁc coin. In this way there
would be a single evolving system, and the prediction is that
natural pedagogy and language will never dissociate. An obvious
way to explore this hypothesis further empirically is to compare
typically developing children and children with communicative
disorders regarding their capacity to learn diﬀerent kinds of
information through communication. In such a study, we
would expect that particular problems in language development
(e.g., a delay in the individual onset of proto-determiner
phrases and proto-sentences) would be signiﬁcantly associated
to an atypical development of natural pedagogy (see Language
and Learning from Communication as Two Non-Dissociable
Capacities).
Connecting language to natural pedagogy could also motivate
a new proposal within the currently stagnant debate about
the origins and evolution of our linguistic capacity (Hauser
et al., 2014). In contrast with living non-human apes who
basically learn traditions emulating older generations — i.e.,
trying to reproduce the end result of actions through trial
and error method (Tennie et al., 2009)2— communication is
the main source of knowledge for humans (Coady, 1973). If
linguistic structures are inherent to human-speciﬁc forms of
communication as we here defend, then in exploring these
structures we could understand better the main “social-cognitive
2Whiten et al. (2009) criticized the idea that apes are exclusively emulators,
suggesting that they are also able to imitate others’ strategies to achieve speciﬁc
results. Be it as it may, for our present discussion it is enough to say that the
transmission of traditions through communication is only observed in humans
(Csibra and Gergely, 2006).
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skills that enable (humans) to develop, in concert with others
in their cultural groups, creative ways of coping with whatever
challenges may arise” and “deal with everything from the
Arctic to the tropics” (Tomasello and Herrmann, 2010, p. 7).
Perhaps the emergence of the so-called Mousterian stone tool
technology in hominin evolution relied on this human-speciﬁc
mechanism — after all, it succeeded the Acheulean technology,
which is the stone tool tradition that has remained the longest
in human evolution and yet “true and persistent innovation
does appear to be lacking” in it (Ambrose, 2001; Nowell and
White, 2010, p. 76). If we can show that the faculty of language
is not simply ‘a symbolic system’ (an idea that perhaps is
implicit in Csibra and Gergely, 2006, and in Tomasello and
Herrmann, 2010) but the symbolic and referential system behind
all human-speciﬁc forms of referential communication, the
interpretation given by Wynn and Coolidge (2010; see above)
that pointing “would have been enough” to teach apprentices
how to produce the Mousterian tool in question would favor our
hypothesis that at least a proto-language was in place by that
point.
In summary, we will argue here for a faculty of language as a
‘non-encapsulated’ universal capacity that is inherent to aspects
of communication and meaning that are human-speciﬁc — and
we will do so by focusing on a core capacity for humans, namely
natural pedagogy. In order to ground the present perspective,
in the ﬁrst section we will explore the connections between
declarative gestures and the faculty of language in more detail,
while in the second our focus will be on the relation between
diﬀerent linguistic structures and the kinds of knowledge that
children can acquire or convey through communication. We
will conclude by suggesting that human communication —
and speciﬁcally our species-speciﬁc capacity to acquire cultural
knowledge through it — is deeply rooted in the faculty of
language.
Declarative Gestures: Language’s Illegitimate
Child
Csibra and Gergely (2006, 2009, 2011) state that only humans
among all living species have natural pedagogy: i.e., the capacity
to transmit cultural knowledge through communication to
new generations and the capacity of new generations to learn
cultural knowledge from communication. Brieﬂy, an adult
manifests his communicative intention to a child by directing
an ‘ostensive signal’ (e.g., eye contact) to her and then the
child instinctively expects to receive new information about
some object in the immediate surrounding world — a piece
of information that she generalizes to every object of the same
kind. Evidence shows that by 4 months of age infants already
react to adult ostensive signals, but only by 10 months of
age do these stimuli induce them (i) to expect and follow
declarative gestures like pointing or gaze-shift to identify a
referent in the world and (ii) to consider the adult’s attitude
toward the referent an informative behavior (Csibra, 2010). In
other words, at 10 months of age infants expect and come to
be part of a ‘deictic space’ within which cultural information
can be acquired by connecting the third person (established
at this moment exclusively through declarative gestures), the
second and the ﬁrst person (established through ostensive
signals).
Csibra and Gergely (2006) argue that declarative gestures
are our earliest form of referent assignment not only in
development, but also in evolution. These gestures and broadly
speaking “the ability to teach and to learn from teaching (are)
a primary, independent, and possibly phylogenetically even
earlier adaptation than language” (Csibra and Gergely, 2006,
p. 2). Within this view, only symbolic and iconic gestures,
but not indexical gestures like pointing, would be associated
to language. Our goal in this section is to challenge this
statement, presenting evidence that the human use of indexical
gestures and natural pedagogy reﬂect structural aspects of
language.
The relation between declarative gestures and language
development has been explored in many studies (see for
example Butterworth and Morissette, 1996; Markus et al.,
2000). Colonnesi et al. (2010) examined twenty-ﬁve of these
studies (734 children in total), concluding that pointing is
related to speech both longitudinally and concurrently: (i)
longitudinally, the amount of pointing produced by infants
predicts their speech production rates (see also Butterworth,
2003) and (ii) concurrently, pointing is used in integration
with speech. Importantly, they found statistically signiﬁcant
associations between declarative pointing and language already
by 10–11 months of age — when infants start to produce
declarative gestures but still do not produce words — and the
strongest associations between 15 and 20 months of age. These
associations were found for declarative pointing (i.e., a gesture
that ‘declares’ a referent, e.g., when a child points at a dog) but not
for imperative gestures (i.e., a gesture that children use to induce
others to take an object for them, using other people as tools to
solve an immediate problem).
Children ﬁrst start to produce co-speech gesture combinations
to convey ‘reinforced information’ — for example, pointing at
a dog and saying ‘dog’ — and only later in development they
produce ‘supplemented information’ — for example, pointing
at a dog and saying ‘go,’ a kind of combination in which
each modality (speech and gesture) conveys diﬀerent pieces
of information (Goldin-Meadow and Butcher, 2003; Iverson
and Goldin-Meadow, 2005; ÖzçalIs¸kan and Goldin-Meadow,
2009; Cartmill et al., 2014). Importantly, the emergence of the
latter never precedes the former in development, and each of
these combinations predicts the individual onset of speciﬁc
linguistic structures in speech, i.e.: the individual onset of
reinforced co-speech-gestures predicts the individual onset of
determiner phrases in speech, while supplemented co-speech-
gestures predict the individual onset of sentences in speech
(Goldin-Meadow and Butcher, 2003; ÖzçalIs¸kan and Goldin-
Meadow, 2009; Cartmill et al., 2014). The successive emergence of
‘proto-determiner phrases’ and ‘proto-sentences’ in the one-word
period moreover parallels the fact that the words that children
are producing at around 14 months of age are nouns related to
people (e.g., ‘baby,’ ‘dad’ etc.), objects (e.g., ‘banana’) and animals
(e.g., ‘rabbit’), and expressive utterances like ‘hello,’ while only
at around 19 months of age do they start to produce verb-
like words like ‘woof ’ and ‘yes/no’ answers — a developmental
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pattern observed in signing and speaking children alike, as well
as in monolinguals and bilinguals (Nelson, 1973; Holowka et al.,
2002)3.
When humans produce or comprehend declarative gestures
they are necessarily connecting referents in the external world
to concepts in their internal world. Natural pedagogy can only
transmit knowledge about kinds because such a connection
exists. Our claim here is that the mechanism underlying this
bridge between external and internal world is the faculty of
language, which is our symbolic and referential system par
excellence: the development of this very faculty leads children
from the use of declarative gestures — alone or combined with
meaningless vocalizations or one-word utterances — to a more
complex set of ‘resources’, by which diﬀerent forms of reference
(such as nominal and temporal reference) and concepts can be
linked in multiple ways, giving rise to a pedagogy that conveys
diﬀerent kinds of information4. This is why declarative pointing
and speech are strongly related along development5, and, as we
will suggest in the remainder of this section, this is also the reason
why non-human animals (chimpanzees, cats, dogs, dolphins etc.)
do not produce or comprehend declarative gestures (pointing and
gaze following) in the same way that infants at 10 months of
age do.
Evidence demonstrates that chimpanzees do not comprehend
pointing as a declarative gesture (Povinelli et al., 2003; Miklósi
and Soproni, 2006). Povinelli et al. (1997) trained seven
chimpanzees to use experimenter’s pointing gestures to locate
a treat hidden in one of several possible locations. After many
trials, the apes responded to these gestures very accurately, so the
researchers increased the distance between the correct location
of the treat and the distal end of the experimenter’s pointing. In
this situation, the success rate of ﬁve of the seven chimpanzees
3While we strongly agree with Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (2005) that ‘gesture
and speech form a single integrated system,’ for these authors human gesture
‘paves the way’ for or ‘facilitates’ language development. By contrast, we suggest
that infants’ declarative gestures are themselves the expression of emerging
linguistic structures, structures that gradually become more complex throughout
the development of the faculty of language. This perspective makes sense of the
humanly unique features of declarative gestures such as their bipartite structure,
the inherent intentionality (with a ‘t’) and intensionality (with an ‘s’) of the forms
of reference involved (see further discussion at the end of this section), and their
central role in the emergence of natural pedagogy.
4Importantly, declarative gestures not only start out as part of our referential,
linguistic system, but they crucially remain an inherent aspect of this system once
it has developed fully. In particular, this kind of gesture is a fundamental ingredient
in demonstrative reference with deictic expressions such as ‘this’ and ‘that’, which
are universal (Diessel, 2006). Deictic reference has long been noted to be disturbed
in people on the autism spectrum (Hobson et al., 2010), a disturbance that is, as we
would predict, part of larger signiﬁcant anomalies in the referential use of language
in this population (Modyanova, 2009). Interestingly, deictic gestures do not seem
to be impaired in children with SLI (Iverson and Braddock, 2011), and therefore
we would expect them to have a better control of the grammar of nominal structure
compared to children on the autism spectrum — although they do show problems
with it as well, such as producing signiﬁcantly more substitutions of deﬁnite articles
than age-matched TD children (Polite et al., 2011; Chondrogianni and Marinis,
2015).
5Our perspective in this sense is compatible with McNeill’s (2014) general view
that some gestures and speech comprise a single, integrated multimodal system,
while there are also early gestures not related to it. The latter, according to him,
are quite diﬀerent from gestures that are uniﬁed with speech in what he calls a
‘dual semiosis’ — i.e., when “gesture and speech become co-expressive rather than
supplemental” (Levy and McNeill, 2015, p. 173).
decreased from 100% of correct choices to chance levels, making
the researchers conclude that “apes were simply focusing on
the local conﬁguration of the experimenter’s hand and the box”
(Povinelli et al., 2003, p. 60). However, since two apes still
performed above the chance level, the researchers conducted a
new experiment with the seven chimpanzees: in one case the
experimenter was closer to the incorrect location and in another
case the tip of the experimenter’s ﬁnger was equidistant from the
two possible locations (in both cases, of course, the experimenter
was pointing to the correct location). Results showed that all
chimpanzees made the wrong choice in the condition where
the experimenter was placed closer to the incorrect location; in
the other condition, all apes performed randomly. Finally and
essential to our discussion, the authors also observed that 3 year-
old children were perfectly accurate from the ﬁrst trial onward in
the same experimental procedure6.
The study of Povinelli et al. (1997) thus shows that after much
training chimpanzees can learn that some perceptual aspects of
the experimenter’s physical disposition can be used as ‘hints’ to
determine the location of the treat — strongly contrasting with
infants, who spontaneously start comprehending and producing
declarative gestures by 10 months of age (Butterworth, 2003;
Cartmill et al., 2012). On the other hand, chimpanzees seem
to perform much better in tasks involving gaze and head
movement: they follow experimenter’s line of sight even when
it projects outside their perceptual ﬁeld (an ability that emerges
in children only by 18 months of age; Butterworth, 2003) and
they also take into account that this line of sight can not cross
opaque screens (Povinelli and Eddy, 1996). Can this be evidence
that chimpanzees comprehend other’s gazing at a target as a
declarative gesture, just as humans do?
We believe that the answer is no, but before explaining our
position we also want to consider brieﬂy the ability of some
non-primates to take into account human pointing gestures.
Cats, dogs, dolphins, and seals perform the experiment described
before (Povinelli et al., 1997) much better than chimpanzees —
and they do it at a high level from the beginning of the test,
just like children (Miklósi and Soproni, 2006). Furthermore,
dogs seem to improve their performance even more when the
pointing gesture is preceded by eye contact (Miklósi and Soproni,
2006) — which is a strong parallel with children’s sensitivity
to adults’ ostensive signals. All this raises the question whether
both sensitivity to ostensive signals and declarative gestures,
far from being speciﬁc to humans, might be something that
can independently emerge in cooperative species (e.g., dolphins)
and/or can be the evolutionary consequence of domestication
(which would also explain that dogs realize better than wolves the
6For Povinelli et al. (2003), the reason behind children’s success in this experiment
is their capacity for theory of mind, something that they claim to be absent
in chimpanzees. We, on the other hand, suggest that their comprehension of
declarative gestures is above all related to the referential mechanism of human
language. The described study cannot exclude our position, which is supported
by the evidence presented throughout this section. Independently of that, much
evidence, reviewed in De Villiers (2007), suggests that full and explicit theory of
mind is language-dependent. In this way, even if we attribute some form of theory
of mind to one or another non-linguistic species, this does not mean that the
members of this species think propositionally and have a capacity for intentional
reference (see Fitch, 2010: P. 187–194).
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mentioned experiment) (Miklósi and Soproni, 2006; Topál et al.,
2009).
The main problem for this line of thought is that these
experiments do not show that the same interpretative bias lies
behind the correct behavioral response of chimpanzees, dogs,
and infants (Povinelli and Eddy, 1996; Topál et al., 2009). For
example, babies at 6 months of age also seem to be able to follow
adults’ gaze (Butterworth, 2003), but they do this diﬀerently
from infants at 10 months of age, in two respects: ﬁrstly, the
precise identiﬁcation of the target is determined by the salience
of the object in the situation — a mechanism that Butterworth
(2003) called ‘ecological mechanism of joint visual attention.’ In
our view, an analogous ‘ecological mechanism’ can be suggested
for animals like dogs: they seem to try to satisfy instructor’s
expectation taking to him (or ﬁnding) some salient object whose
location is indicated by pointing or gazing (Topál et al., 2009).
Secondly, we use declarative gestures for more than directing
others’ attention to salient objects, and infants by 10 months of
age are aware of this: they expect to receive new information
about the kind of the assigned referent.
Therefore, both chimpanzees and dogs are able to perform
as well as infants in tasks involving, respectively, gaze following
and pointing, and both seem to be sensitive to ostensive signals
(Miklósi and Soproni, 2006), but we have seen that only in
the case of the infants, ostensive signals make them expect the
transmission of new information about the kind of the assigned
referent. This can be explained in light of the faculty of language,
which is at the same time a referential and a symbolic system —
i.e., a system that connects the external world to our internal,
conceptual world. Although infants by 10 months of age still do
not produce words, this system has already started to develop:
they can only acquire knowledge about kinds because (i) they hold
concepts in relation to these kinds, and (ii) they can link these
concepts to assigned referents in the situational context (Hinzen
and Sheehan, 2013:ch. 2; Bickerton, 2014).
The use of artiﬁcial language by apes illustrates very well
the unique character of human language as a referential and
conceptual system. Cartmill and Maestripieri (2012) observed
that apes can use arbitrary gestural symbols that are not linked
to internal states like emotions, they can map these symbols
to objects of the world and they can learn these symbols from
passive observation. However, the authors aﬃrm that although
apes are (i) “provided with individual units that are analogous to
human words (i.e., referential, arbitrary, taught)” (Cartmill and
Maestripieri, 2012, p. 19), they (ii) “do not display any aptitude
in combining the units in a systematic or meaningful way.” The
problem here is that reference emerges in human language only
from the structure of phrases, not from words alone (Rozendaal
and Baker, 2008, 2010; Martin and Hinzen, 2014), therefore
being able to “combine the units in a systematic or meaningful
way” (ii) is a necessary condition for human referentiality. For
example, the arguments of the sentences ‘a cat meows,’ ‘the cat
meows’ or ‘this cat meows’ are not ‘referential isolated words’
but determiner phrases — i.e., they combine referential operators
with nouns. In short, the word ‘cat’ alone is not referential at
all. Furthermore, the position of the determiner phrase in the
sentence structure can prevent its referentiality —e.g., in ‘a thief
entered,’ the determiner phrase ‘a thief ’ picks out a referent, while
in ‘that guy is a thief ’ the same determiner phrase ‘a thief ’ works
as a predicate (picking out a property ascribed to a referent
instead of a referent).
Referentiality in humans is a combinatorial phenomenon
par excellence, therefore an inaptitude in “combining the units”
suggests that apes cannot display the kind of referentiality
produced by human language either. This combinatorial aspect
of human referentiality explicitly guides infants’ use of declarative
gestures: at the beginning these are often produced with
meaningless vocalizations (Cartmill et al., 2012), which gives
place to one-word utterances by 12months of age— importantly,
children’s initial vocabulary seems to be related to the number
of diﬀerent kinds of objects that they point to before the
one-word period (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 2005), which
indicates that lexical concepts are already in place at this
moment, being combined with declarative gestures in children’s
communication. In the terms of Martin and Hinzen (2014), in
a deﬁnite description like ‘the dog,’ the determiner ‘the’ is the
‘edge’ of the phrase and regulates its referentiality (determining
deﬁniteness in this instance), while ‘dog’ is the ‘interior’ of the
phrase and determines the descriptive content involved in the
act of reference. Therefore, infants’ declarative gestures express
the referential edge of the determiner phrase, while their words
(pronounced or not) are related to the conceptual interior of
this nominal structure (which is linked to their knowledge about
kinds)7. In short, while Cartmill and Maestripieri (2012) state
that non-human apes can use an artiﬁcial language referentially
but not combinatorially, we state that human language is
referential because it is combinatorial — not combinatoriality
in a generic sense (of a type, for example, that can be found in
artiﬁcial languages or music as well), but related speciﬁcally to
grammar, which correlates with the genesis of referentiality in
language.
To stress our point, we agree with Petitto (2000, p. 383) that it
remains uncontroversial that “all chimpanzees fail to master key
aspects of human language structure, even when you give them a
way to bypass their inability to speak — for example, by exposing
them to (. . .) natural signed languages” (see also Tomasello,
2008). For her, and for us as well, this indicates that chimpanzees
lack cross-modal mechanisms that ground the development of
both signing and speaking of any natural language, rather than
merely mechanisms for perceiving and expressing speech sounds.
In our view, however, these cross-modal linguistic mechanisms
do not only involve the necessary ability to “detect aspects of
7Iverson and Thelen (1999) observe that speech and gesture are strongly
synchronized in adults but not in children, even when gesture and vocalizations
occur together. The authors then propose, based on neurophysiological and
neuropsychological evidence, to account for the timing relationship between them
throughout development as follows: “During the time when infants are just
beginning to acquire many new words, speech requires concentration and eﬀort,
much like the early stages of any skill learning. As infants practice their new vocal
skills, thresholds for hand–mouth activity decrease, and (. . .) (when) the level of
activation generated by words is well beyond that required to reach threshold, it
has the eﬀect of capturing gesture and activating it simultaneously” (p. 35). In our
view, this explanation accounts well for the fact that declarative gestures and ‘non-
pronounced words’/meaningless vocalizations/words could still be connected to
the same linguistic structure in infants’ mind, even when their gestural and oral
production are not strongly synchronized yet.
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the patterning of language (. . .) the temporal and distributional
regularities initially corresponding to the syllabic and prosodic
levels of natural language organization” (Petitto, 2000, p. 397),
but also the capacity to perform reference — indeed, this
referential mechanism seems to play an important role in the
acquisition of native phonetic structures: at 9 months of age,
infants enhance the discrimination of sounds that co-occur with
distinct referents (Yeung and Werker, 2009), at the same time
that their ability to statistically learn phonetic categories starts to
decrease (Yoshida et al., 2010).
The combinatorial nature of referentiality in humans (i.e.,
a referentiality grounded on linguistic structures formed by a
referential edge and a semantic interior) explains a further, long-
noted aspect of ‘intentionality’ (with a ‘t’), namely ‘intensionality’
(with an ‘s’), which is induced by the lexical description of the
nominal phrase. By (human) intentionality (with a ‘t’) we mean
the deliberate reference to things based on internal concepts,
while intensionality (with an ‘s’) arises because, if I know a
referent under one description, I may of course not know it under
an indeﬁnite number of others — in other words, descriptions
applicable to the same referent could be non-equivalent in the
subject’s mind. Thus I may not know that a colleague, Mr.
Smith, is also my wife’s secret lover, or my daughter’s most hated
teacher. My thought or statement that Mr. Smith is an honorable
gentleman is therefore inaccurately (or at least misleadingly)
reported as the thought or statement that my wife’s secret lover
is an honorable gentleman, even if the two descriptions pick
out exactly the same man. Now, it would be equally misleading
for someone to say, if I point to what is (for me) Mr. Smith,
that I pointed to my wife’s lover: the description stands between
the referent and the person referring, as it were, and also in
pointing, reference is systematically dependent on description.
If declarative gestures exhibit intensionality in this sense (and
consequently intentionality, as the latter is inherent to the
former), it is hard to see how they are not inherently linguistic,
given the inherent diﬃculty of establishing intensionality for any
non-linguistic animal (Davidson, 1982)8,9.
8Throughout this paper, we assume a crucial distinction between animal
abstraction and human concepts, explicated in more detail in Hinzen and Sheehan
(2013, ch. 2). Animals can form abstract perceptual stimulus classes, which order
their experience in adaptive ways. This is a necessary but not a suﬃcient condition
for human concepts. Concepts are abstractions that necessarily exist as the ‘interior’
of linguistic structures. These linguistic structures allow us to establish connections
between the external and the internal world without the necessity of a perceptual
mediation. In non-human animals, their perceptual input activates and ‘combines’
with their abstract knowledge, but human abstractions can be associated to
linguistic ‘edges’ instead of percepts.
9Full (explicit) theory of mind inherently involves an understanding of both
intensionality and intentionality, since beliefs that we attribute to agents have both
intentional contents (they are intentionally directed at objects), and these contents
feature concepts that can give rise to intensionality eﬀects (objects referred to
do not have the properties that the concepts of them capture and vice versa).
It is in line with the present viewpoint that there is extensive evidence for a
developmental link between language, explicit theory of mind, and intensionality
(Rakoczy et al., 2015), as well as language (speciﬁcally, the understanding of
ﬁnite clausal complements around the fourth birthday) and explicit theory of
mind (De Villiers, 2007; De Villiers and De Villiers, 2012). Further evidence for
this link comes from children with autism spectrum conditions (Paynter and
Peterson, 2010), and from overlaps in the neural correlates of theory of mind and
the language comprehension network (Ferstl et al., 2008). Astington and Jenkins
(1999) classical longitudinal study of 3-year old infants found that controlling
Natural pedagogy, then, could, as we have argued, be the
comprehension side of a coin that has proto-determiner phrases
as its production side. Through natural pedagogy, infants connect
assigned referents in the external world to concepts in the internal
world, promoting an ‘exchange’ in which their current knowledge
‘explains’ the stimuli and interlocutors’ behavior toward the
stimuli modiﬁes infants’ current knowledge. The emergence of
proto-sentences in language development will be equally related
to the emergence of a new pedagogy: one that is based, as we will
argue in the next section, on the transmission of knowledge about
facts.
Therefore, if we take as ‘declarative’ only the gestures that
are used as expressions of nominal ‘edges,’ linking the external
world to our conceptual/internal world, these gestures are not
only human-speciﬁc but linguistically based. In this way we
disagree with views that describe declarative gestures as merely
something used to “re-direct(s) the partner’s attention to some
distant object or event” (Leavens, 2004, p. 395). This is a necessary
but not a suﬃcient condition for declarative gestures in the sense
that we have assumed here. ‘Declarative gestures’ as deﬁned by
Leavens (2004) can be comprehended by distantly related species
like dogs, cats, dolphins, seals, and also chimpanzees (in this
latter case only gaze and head movement), hence a necessary
distinction is missed. Declarative gestures in our sense seem to
have only emerged in hominin evolution, being not only related
to the emergence of natural pedagogy but also to the emergence
of a (proto-) language that allowed our ancestors to produce (at
least) proto-determiner phrases10.
In the following section we will try to demonstrate that natural
pedagogy can be better understood if we take into consideration
the speciﬁc developmental stage of language that parallels its
emergence. In doing so, we will be able to not only understand
natural pedagogy but also the emergence of other forms of
communicative learning.
Language and Learning from Communication
as Two Non-Dissociable Capacities
In this section we will defend the hypothesis that the faculty
of language and the capacity to learn from communication
are intrinsically related. In order to do so, we will argue
that the earliest form of communicative learning to emerge in
development — natural pedagogy — can be better understood
in light of the ﬁrst kind of linguistic structure that infants
produce — namely what we called proto-determiner phrases.
On the other hand, the emergence of sentence-like structures in
language development gives rise to another form of ‘pedagogy’:
for earlier theory of mind, earlier language abilities predicted later theory-of-
mind test performance, while the reverse, controlling for earlier language, was not
the case. On the other hand, theory of mind is arguably a composite function
involving a number of diﬀerent cognitive abilities, including face recognition (in
seeing infants), empathy, tracking intentions and goals, and other abilities besides
language.
10Tomasello (2006, p. 520) suggests that “asking why only humans use language
is like asking why only humans build skyscrapers (. . .) (and so) asking why apes
do not have language may not be our most productive question. A much more
productive question (. . .) (is) why apes do not even point”. But it follows from our
account that these two questions are precisely related: the answer why apes do not
point may lie on the fact that they do not have a faculty of language.
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one that conveys information about particular events, actions,
and state of aﬀairs. Both pedagogies presuppose a ‘communicative
triangulation’ between the speaker (the grammatical ﬁrst person),
a hearer (the second), and an assigned referent (the third),
but only sentential structures can produce statements about the
world, statements that, by their very nature, can be true or false.
Finally, we will show that language development gradually frees
children’s statements from their temporal, spatial, and anaphoric
ties, allowing them to talk about entities that are not physically
present in the situational context, events that happened or will
happen in a remote past or future and entities and/or claims that
were previously mentioned in a conversation.
Csibra and Gergely (2006, 2009, 2011) point out that natural
pedagogy is speciﬁc to humans, not because no animal can
communicate or learn, but because they are not able to learn
generic knowledge from communication. The problem is that
animal forms of communication like alarm calls (i) always convey
ﬁxed conﬁgurations of message and referent and (ii) are always
restricted to the immediate situation of subjects — for example,
they alert conspeciﬁcs to the presence of predators, indicating
with a single signal that, say, an aerial predator is approaching
(Csibra and Gergely, 2011). Natural pedagogy, however, can
convey a potentially inﬁnite set of information about the same
referent, and this information is generalized to other objects
of the same kind. In other words, we can point at a bird and
communicate many diﬀerent things about it, and the hearer will
consider this information in other moments and places for the
same kind of entities. This suggests that at the proto-DP stage,
where sentential conﬁgurations are still missing, new information
is not actually tied to time and space. As we shall see below, what
changes in the proto-S stage are not the elements of abstraction
(e.g., lexical concepts) — they entail, ipso facto, generality,
and function predicatively even in the proto-DP stage —, but
children’s capacity to grammatically cognize temporal and spatial
relations through sentences.
As noted, humans use ostensive signals (e.g., eye-contact) to
demonstrate their communicative intention to an interlocutor
(Csibra, 2010), and adult ostensive signals cause infants from
approximately 10 months onward not only to follow their
deictic gestures (like gaze-shift or pointing) but to expect
novel information about the referent’s kind. Furthermore,
infants within ostensive communication assume that this novel
information is available for everyone — reacting when subjects
other than the interlocutor do not take the generic information
into account (Gergely et al., 2007). In this way, infants do
not relate interlocutors’ positive attitude toward, say, a plate
of broccoli to his or her mental state, but to the properties of
broccoli as a kind (e.g., ‘broccoli is good’), and consider that this
property is available to other subjects as well.
Our hypothesis is that children’s capacity to acquire
and transmit knowledge through communication develops in
connection with language. In this way, natural pedagogy is
related to the emergence of proto-determiner phrases and
this very fact gives us insight into why natural pedagogy
transmits generic knowledge about kinds. The explanation is
the following: sentence structures, but not determiner phrases,
relate information to sentential arguments and to a time span —
i.e., a time that can precede, contain or follow the time of
utterance, as in the past-tensed statement ‘the book was on the
table’ (Klein, 1998, 2006). Therefore, when acquiring knowledge
through natural pedagogy, infants seem to take assigned referents
as ‘physical expressions of concepts,’ in such a way that any
new information about these referents automatically constitutes
new information about the concepts to which these referents
are associated. The needed sentential complexity to restrict a
predicate to a time and context is simply not yet there.
Relating natural pedagogy to the proto-DP stage can also
explain why 12 months old infants seem to point declaratively
essentially to obtain generalizable information about the world
and not to inform interlocutors about the situational context
(Southgate et al., 2007). In our view, children can only inform
others when they are able to take referents as arguments of
sentential predicates — as in the case described by Lock (1997) in
which a child uttered the word ‘dog’ and, when her mother asked
‘what is the dog doing?’, she said ‘woof ’. Before that, however,
they use declarative gestures exclusively to indicate the objects
of their interest, stimulating adults to convey new information
about their kinds. This is indeed the only scenario that we
could expect. If children at the proto-DP stage can only extract
generic knowledge from communication, how could they convey
non-generic information about the situational context?
For this reason, we think that we should nuance Csibra’s
and Gergely’s (2006, p. 6) argument that natural pedagogy
is connected to “the predicate-argument (knowledge-referent)
structure of human communication.” This is true if we consider
that natural pedagogy involves the connection of properties
(semantic/conceptual knowledge) to referents, but false if we
imply from this that semantic content and referents are
connected through sentence-like constructions as this kind of
structure only emerges in child development by 18 months
of age (i.e., approximately 8 months after the emergence
of natural pedagogy) (Goldin-Meadow and Butcher, 2003;
Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 2005; ÖzçalIs¸kan and Goldin-
Meadow, 2009). Suggesting that natural pedagogy involves
sentential predicate-argument structures would go against the
developmental pattern of language described in the previous
section and undermine a linguistic explanation for the human-
speciﬁc capacity to acquire, through communication, diﬀerent
kinds of information — respectively, knowledge about kinds and
knowledge about particular events, actions and state of aﬀairs,
which we will call here simply ‘knowledge about facts.’ From this
perspective we hypothesize here that at the DP-stage children
would be able to learn through communication that ‘broccoli’
(as a kind) is good but not that something speciﬁc happened to
her plate of broccoli, like that it fell down. The onset of the latter
capacity would predict (or would be predicted) by the onset of
proto-sentence production.
We currently explore this hypothesis through a longitudinal
study that aims to (i) analyze children’s production of gestural
and oral communication throughout the one-word period and
(ii) verify children’s capacity to acquire information about speciﬁc
events, using a version of Ganea et al.’s (2007) experimental
design with stuﬀed toys. In their study, infants were told that a
particular stuﬀed toy that had been earlier named had undergone
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a change in state while out of view. Subsequently, the infants’
capacity to identify it exclusively on the basis of its new state
was veriﬁed. Although the aim of the authors was to check
children’s capacity to incorporate “(communicative) information
into one’s mental representation of the absent object,” we have
decided to go one step further and see if children’s success
in this test is signiﬁcantly correlated to the individual onset
of proto-sentence production. We also involve children with
communicative disorders, speciﬁcally regarding their production
of communicative gestures (i.e., declarative, descriptive, and
symbolic gestures) and words.
An essential distinction between knowledge about kinds and
knowledge about facts is that only the latter could bear truth
value: it is connected to sentence structures, which is our only
means to acquire and convey true/false information about the
world11. This seems to be in consonance with Prasada (2000,
p. 67), who says that a key aspect of knowledge about kinds is that
“(it is) not rendered false by the existence of instances that lack
the essential property” (e.g., the existence of a three-legged dog
does notmake us to abandon the idea of dogs being four legged12).
In this way, the production of sentential structures by the human
mind would not be necessary for the acquisition of generic
knowledge about kinds through communication, although, of
course, we can express generic information through them (e.g.,
‘dogs are four-legged’).
Determiner phrases allow us to cognize object reference but
not temporal reference13 —which is a fundamental component of
non-generic statements (Klein, 1998, 2006; Sheehan and Hinzen,
2011; Martin and Hinzen, 2014). When adults make claims
11In formal terms, a predicate of the form ‘dog’ that is part of a pointing gesture
at the proto-DP stage need not automatically be interpreted non-propositionally,
after a translation into a formal language. That it corresponds to a proposition
would mean that the child, eﬀectively, is expressing the proposition that the object
pointed to is a dog. In this case, there are propositions the moment that there
are pointing gestures. In particular, where ‘dog’ is a noun, (N dog), the property
of being a dog obtained through abstraction would be λx. dog(x). The formula
[dog(x)]g[a/x] can then be deﬁned as true in model M, iﬀ the individual constant
a is a dog in M under the variable assignment g. A child’s act of pointing can now
be understood as an assignment in this sense, and the reinforced pointing gesture
as conveying the proposition that the object pointed at is a dog. We don’t question
that such a formal translation is possible. Our empirical claim is that, at the point
of the proto-DP, a full model in which propositions can be cognitively evaluated as
true or false is not yet available. We thank Hannes Rieser for conversations on this
issue.
12Prasada (2000) is not talking about statements with statistical prevalence like “all
dogs are four legged” or “X% of dogs are four legged”. According to the author,
knowledge about kinds allows us to “explain the existence of an essential property
in an exemplar by citing the kind of thing it is” (Prasada, 2000, p. 66), as in the
following example cited by the author on page 67:
Why does that have four legs? (pointing at a dog)
Because it is a dog.
13We are not saying here that determiner phrases cannot specify temporal
information lexically, in their ‘interior’ (the NP-part of a complex DP), which
a simple example like ‘John’s smile at last night’s party’ would be enough to
falsify. We are claiming that a complex DP like this one is crucially diﬀerent
from a sentence like ‘John smiled at last night’s party’, which establishes temporal
deixis grammatically. In the former expression, which unlike the latter cannot as
such be true or false, the prepositional phrase ‘at last night’s party’ descriptively
precisiﬁes the assigned referent. In the latter, the verbal inﬂection does not have
any descriptive function for the referentiality of the sentential argument (‘John’),
but sticks a new referential ‘ﬂagpole’ (a temporal one) to which the lexical concept
‘smile’ is attached. The result is reference to an event as opposed to an object,
together with a temporal relation of this event to the time of the speech event.
about particular events or situations, these are always referred
to as preceding, containing or following the time of utterance
(Bonomi, 1995; Klein, 1998, 2006), in such a way that the truth
of these assertions are limited to their speciﬁc ‘temporal frames’.
For example, if I say ‘Cristina was drunk,’ the ﬁnite verb ‘was’
indicates that this claim is about a situation that precedes the
time of utterance, therefore shifting temporal reference to the past
and restricting truth to this time span. Importantly, that ‘Cristina
was drunk’ is true does not indicate that ‘Cristina is drunk’ is
necessarily false: ‘was’ does not establish when the situation ends,
it only indicates for which time span the state of aﬀairs described
by the statement is supposed to be assessed as true14.
Someone could suggest that the so-called ‘tenseless languages’
challenge our hypothesis about the intrinsic connection between
assertion and temporal reference in grammar. Speakers of,
for example, Germanic and Romance languages use ﬁnite
morphology to produce the time span of events referred to in
assertions, but languages like Yucatec Maya (Bohnemeyer, 2009)
and Tupí-Guarani (Tonhauser, 2011) are said to be tenseless.
However, the question in these cases is how interlocutors connect
statements to time spans and not whether these statements are or
are not linked to them (Bohnemeyer, 2009). In this way, for our
purpose it is enough to say that languages have diﬀerent forms to
encode the time span of assertions and that these forms emerge
gradually in language development.
Another possible criticism is that linguistic resources like
ﬁnite morphology and temporal adverbs do not emerge when
children start to make assertions either (Blom, 2003; Dimroth
et al., 2003; Jolink, 2005), and therefore their claims would not
be circumscribed to any temporal frame. Evidence nevertheless
shows that children’s untensed claims are by default related to the
time of utterance: from the proto-sentence stage to approximately
31 months of age, children seem to only make claims about
events, actions, and state of aﬀairs that happen at around the
moment of their speech (Morford and Goldin-Meadow, 1997).
The ability to make reference to remote events in the past or
future seems to be related to the development of ﬁniteness in
language, which starts to emerge by 24 months of age and is fully
mastered by 36 months of age (Blom, 2003; Dimroth et al., 2003;
Jolink, 2005).
Morford and Goldin-Meadow (1997) also noted that the
home-signing deaf children in their study, despite the lack
of a conventional language model to learn from, ﬁrst started
to talk about events that happened or were about to happen
at around the time of their Signing and only later did they
communicate about events in a distant past or future. Therefore,
although the lack of linguistic input seems to have delayed the
maturation and performance of temporal reference in the home-
signing deaf children of the study — they talked about both
near and distant events less often, and started to do it over a
year later compared to hearing children —, the development
of temporal reference followed the same stages observed for
hearing children. It therefore appears that temporal reference is
14Klein (1998) illustrates this point with the sentence ‘John was dead.’ Unless you
believe in the possibility of resurrection, John is still dead and will continue being
dead. Therefore, the ﬁnite element ‘was’ only indicates that he supposedly died
before the time of utterance, not the end of the situation.
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such a fundamental milestone in the development of the faculty
of language (and consequently, of human communication) that
even in the absence of linguistic input, the home-signing deaf
children developed their own means to talk about remote past
or future events — e.g., creating novel gestures, adapting some
conventional gestures from their hearing community in order to
mark temporal displacement.
Apart from releasing children’s statements from their
‘temporal ties,’ language development also frees them from their
‘spatial’ and ‘anaphoric’ constraints. Let us consider the following
example: ‘A racoon chased the cat.’ In this sentence, the indeﬁnite
noun phrase “a racoon” introduces a new referent into the
conversation — in languages like English and French, indeﬁnite
noun phrases cannot be used to refer to given referents (De Cat,
2004; Rozendaal and Baker, 2008) —, while the deﬁnite noun
phrase ‘the cat’ either refers to a given referent in the discourse
(i.e., to a cat that was previously mentioned in the conversation)
or to a cat that the interlocutors mutually know from before
(Rozendaal and Baker, 2008). In relation to adding new referents
to a conversation, we have seen that children at the one-word
period still do not use indeﬁnite or deﬁnite noun phrases to
assign referents but rather use declarative gestures, which makes
these toddlers highly dependent on the situational context15.
With regards to anaphoric reference to elements (entities or
propositions) that were previously mentioned in a conversation,
children simply seem to omit them in their utterances (as in the
example mentioned before in which the child said just ‘woof,’
omitting the agent of the action (the dog) that was already
referred to in her conversation with her mother). This represents
an insuperable barrier for managing conversations with many
competing given referents, as probably is the case of most adult
conversations — indeed, this seems to be a problem even for
children at the beginning of the multi-word period (Salazar Orvig
et al., 2010).
In this way, at the beginning children’s statements are
completely related to the here-and-now of speech and generally
restricted to few (if not a single) referent. Then, throughout
language development, children gradually shed these ties. By
24 months of age they start assigning referents that are not
necessarily present in the situational context through determiner
phrases in speech, and by 31 months of age they start to
talk about events located in a remote past or future through
linguistic resources like tense morphology, temporal adverbs etc.
Finally, the emergence of anaphoric resources in language allows
children to grammatically articulate diﬀerent given elements of
a conversation in new, asserted information — as in the case of
the simple sentence ‘she did it’ (Lambrecht, 1994) in which all
constituents have an anaphoric form but the sentence itself adds
a new fact for the interlocutor.
15There is a dispute regarding whether children can also use pointing to ‘now-
empty locations’ to indicate an object that is no longer present (see Liszkowski
et al., 2007, for a defense of this claim and Southgate et al., 2007, for a criticism of
it). Here this discussion is not fundamental because in both cases pointing has a
deictic function (i.e., children use it in contingence to the immediate surrounding
world, even if they are trying to denote a ‘now-absent object’). Be it as it may, we
will adopt for explanatory reasons the claim made by Southgate et al. (2007) that
children can only use pointing in reference to present or occlude objects.
To summarize, we have argued in this section that knowledge
about kinds is grounded on (proto-)DP structures, which
emerges approximately 8 months before (proto-)sentences in
development. Only sentence structures can bind information
to a time span and to sentential arguments, and this is the
reason why the knowledge conveyed through natural pedagogy
is never restricted to the referent in the situational context but
generalized to all other objects of the same kind. Furthermore,
we also argued that the development of linguistic resources
for nominal and temporal reference in speech not only frees
child statements from their spatial and temporal ties, but also
allows children to grammatically connect their assertions to
entities and/or propositions that were previously mentioned in a
conversation. All in all, therefore, language and communicative
learning go hand-in-hand in a very speciﬁc sense: the kind of
knowledge that humans can exchange through communication is
grounded on the linguistic structures that we are able to cognize
in the course of development. In our view, communicative
learning is rooted in the faculty of language rather than being
a diﬀerent and unconnected human-speciﬁc trait. This is a
parsimonious conclusion considering that, in general, evolution
is a conservative process, which means that “novel applications
generally arise via utilization of preexisting mechanisms” instead
of “depending upon de novo mutation and selection” (Richman
and Naftolin, 2006, p. 7).
Conclusion
We have defended a perspective in which language and learning
from communication form two non-dissociable capacities. From
this perspective, natural pedagogy represents an initial challenge,
since it was originally proposed as a non-linguistic (although
human-speciﬁc) capacity, both in development and evolution
(Csibra and Gergely, 2006). However, we have argued in
Section “Declarative Gestures: Language’s Illegitimate Child”
that declarative gestures — fundamental for natural pedagogy
as they are the ﬁrst form of referent assignment that infants
can understand and produce — are the Achilles heel of this
hypothesis. Firstly, children’s initial vocabulary seems to be linked
to the number of diﬀerent kinds of objects that they point to
before the onset of the one-word period (Iverson and Goldin-
Meadow, 2005), which indicates that lexical concepts are being
combined with declarative gestures at this moment. Furthermore,
although by 10 months of age infants are still unable to produce
words, they have started to understand lexical concepts insofar
as they acquire generic information about referents’ kinds. These
symbols are also behind both, the intentionality (with a ‘t’)
and intensionality (with an ‘s’) of declarative gestures. We have
seen in Section “Declarative Gestures: Language’s Illegitimate
Child” that, despite the fact that animals like dogs seem to be
sensitive to ostensive signals and to understand the directionality
of pointing, they never expect to receive new, generic information
from communication (Miklósi and Soproni, 2006; Topál et al.,
2009). Humans seem to comprehend declarative gestures in a
way that can only be explained in light of a system that is
symbolic and referential at the same time, a system that no
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other living animal has. Evidence and parsimony suggest that
language is the best candidate that we can appeal to in this
regard.
Moreover, combinations of declarative gestures and lexical
concepts obey a developmental pattern: children start combining
pointing and isolated words to ‘reinforce’ the identity of referents
in the situational context — e.g., pointing at a dog plus the word
‘dog’ — and only later in development do they combine gesture
and isolated words to produce ‘supplementary’ meaning — e.g.,
pointing at a dog plus the word ‘go’.We’ve seen that the individual
onset of these stages predicts, respectively, the individual onset of
determiner phrases and sentences in two-word speech, the reason
why we called them proto-DP and proto-S stages.
In the same way that natural pedagogy and the proto-DP stage
are two sides of the same coin, the emergence of the proto-S stage
in development gives rise to a pedagogy with new properties.
While natural pedagogy conveys knowledge about kinds, the
pedagogy based on sentence structures conveys knowledge about
facts. Knowledge about kinds would be not only generic but
unfalsiﬁable, while knowledge about facts can be non-generic
and falsiﬁable — being bound both to sentential arguments
(expressed through deﬁnite and indeﬁnite noun phrases, bare
plurals, pronouns etc.) and to verbal inﬂections that specify
for which time span the piece of information is supposed to
be assessed as true (the past, present, or future of the time of
utterance). For example, from our perspective children’s capacity
to understand through communication that a speciﬁc stuﬀed
toy has fallen or got wet would rely on their mental ability to
build sentence structures — a prediction testable in diﬀerent
populations, as noted.
Furthermore, we tried to explore in more detail the proto-
DP and proto-S stages that we outlined in Section “Language
and Learning from Communication as Two Non-Dissociable
Capacities”. First, we have seen that at the proto-DP stage,
infants and young children are able to introduce referents for
a conversation, but they cannot talk about them. The reason
for us is related to the fact that they still do not produce
sentential predicate-argument structures. Second, we have argued
that at the beginning of the proto-S stage, children’s statements
are bound to the place and moment of the conversation:
they can only introduce referents through declarative gestures
and their statements are never related to a remote past or
future (Morford and Goldin-Meadow, 1997). The more the use
of determiner phrases and ﬁniteness in speech increases, the
more communication becomes relational —allowing children
to introduce referents that are not present in the situational
context (i.e., the ‘here’ of the interlocutors) and to talk about
distant events in the past or in the future (i.e., the ‘now’ of the
interlocutors) (Morford and Goldin-Meadow, 1997; Rozendaal
and Baker, 2008). Finally, we have also argued that language
development improves children’s capacity to perform anaphoric
reference to diﬀerent given elements — either entities or
propositions (Lambrecht, 1994) — in a conversation, which
allows interlocutors to grammatically articulate them to their
assertions.
In short, the faculty of language is responsible for giving rise to
the diﬀerent kinds of information that we can transmit or acquire
through communication throughout our lives. Language does so
by producing structures that are formed by a semantic ‘interior’
and a referential ‘edge’. These structures ground diﬀerent forms
of nominal reference, such as ‘a cat,’ ‘the cat,’ ‘this cat’ etc.,16
(Martin and Hinzen, 2014), as well as diﬀerent forms of temporal
reference, such as ‘he refused a job’. Assertions necessarily involve
both temporal and nominal reference (the latter through the
sentential arguments of the assertion), and their truth value
seems to emerge as a ‘spandrel’ from the convergence of these
‘referentialities’ (together with other grammatical and prosodic
features that mark the assertive character of the sentence). In
taking the faculty of language as a merely symbolic system (as
Enﬁeld, 2009, and Tomasello and Herrmann, 2010, do), we
cannot explain the ontology of the semantics involved — and
consequently not its fundamental role in communicative learning
either.
It is natural that as inquiry into language proceeds, our
vision of what language is (ontology) changes along with our
perspective on it (theory). A conventional formal deﬁnition of
‘language’ and ‘linguistic structure’ has widely inﬂuenced the
language sciences. Although methodological abstractions such as
those that are involved in the formalist paradigm can be well
motivated at a time, they can also cease to be useful, as Chomsky
(1965) in particular stressed. We have argued here that, instead
of viewing language as an ‘encapsulated’ capacity with primarily
formal properties, the faculty of language could be inherent
to aspects of thought, meaning, and communication that are
human-speciﬁc. This insight can also provide a new starting point
for investigating language disorders and impact on their clinical
deﬁnitions, which insofar as they involve the term ‘language’ are
necessarily theory-dependent17.
All in all, language (as identiﬁed and described in the terms
laid out in this article) could play amore essential role in cognitive
development than often supposed, leading to the co-development
of speciﬁc grammatical patterns and the diﬀerent forms of
human communication18 . The range of this perspective could
potentially be further supported through cognitive studies that
explore the connection between referential linguistic structures
and communicative and social abilities in neurotypical and
neurodiverse populations in a comparative fashion, as well as
neurophysiological and neuropsychological studies that aim to
verify overlaps of our language circuitry with other cognitive
capacities such as natural pedagogy.
16Not forgetting, as we mentioned in the Section “Declarative Gestures: Language’s
Illegitimate Child”, that the position occupied by the determiner phrase in the
sentence structure can prevent referentiality. In this way, in the sentence ‘that guy
is a thief,’ the determiner phrase ‘a thief ’ works as a predicate, not picking out any
referent.
17This in particular concerns aspects of language impairment in Autism Spectrum
Disorders, Speciﬁc Language Impairment, and Schizophrenia, on which we have
commented elsewhere (Hinzen et al., 2015; Hinzen and Rosselló, 2015; for a
synthetic statement see Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013, ch. 8). In all of these cases,
language deviance may be an inherent aspect of core symptoms.
18This would be in line with the ‘un-Cartesian’ linguistic project of Hinzen and
Sheehan (2013), which, as a program of research, does not separate human-speciﬁc
forms of thought, reference, and communication from the forms of grammatical
complexity with which they co-occur in our species and from which it appears
they cannot be separated.
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